Many people still think of atomic energy as a matter of scientists with scientific assistants and laboratories with laboratory-type equipment. The factories of the Industrial Group of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority are controlled and directed by engineers and industrial chemists as well as by physicists, most of whom must be as skilled in management as they are in the technical complexities of their work. The employees are process workers of various grades and skilled tradesmen such as fitters, electricians, and instrument mechanics.
When we are thinking of radiation protection we are thinking mainly of workpeople in factories and not of scientists in laboratories.
External Radiation To achieve safe working conditions in a factory operating nuclear piles or chemical plants which separate the plutonium, uranium, and fission products formed in the piles, certain data are necessary. First, the magnitude and spatial distribution of the sources of radiation; second, the type and energy of the radiations emitted by the sources; third, the variation of both of these with time, for example, with the age and operational state of a pile or with the stage reached in a chemical flow sheet; fourth, technical information regarding the types of shielding available, their effectiveness and cost, and the so-called " maximum permissible levels " for the various radiations concerned.
With this data the design staff select the best and most economical material to build the shield around the plant. Gamma rays are stopped most easily by heavy metals like lead, but lead is expensive and it is often cheaper to put up a thick shield of concrete than a thinner shield of lead. To screen a neutron source it is necessary to surround it by a material which will slow neutrons down. (The mechanism of the absorption process is different from that applying to gamma rays.) A good slowing-down medium for neutrons must be made up of light atoms. Concrete, containing as it does a great deal of hydrogen, is a better shielding material for neutrons than lead or iron. Concrete is in fact very useful for shielding purposes because, provided the composition and thickness are properly chosen, it is efficient, cheap, and an excellent building material.
The determination of shield thickness often requires very elaborate calculations but practical experience of shielding large radiation sources is, of course, now available to the industry. Not all shielding is concrete. Water is often an excellent shield since it also permits underwater manipulation of the active material.
It is not always necessary or desirable to shield parts of plant or equipment. The early assessment of the external radiation hazard associated with chemical plant which has carried highly or medium active liquors was such that it was thought either to be impossible or at best extremely difficult and costly to carry out maintenance operations on such plant at all. This had a profound influence on the design of the plant. Considerable ingenuity and inventiveness were exercised to avoid putting items which required maintenance behind biological shields. Also the method of access to the plant and equipment behind the shields was not considered in detail since it was thought that no one would be able to go behind the shields once the plant had become active. In fact the early estimates of radiation levels were not substantially incorrect but the extent to which it would be possible to control work in high-radiation fields so that the worker was not exposed to a radiation dose greater than the permissible was underestimated. It has now been found possible to undertake maintenance and modification work on active plant, and it is important that such work should not be made more difficult and dangerous to the maintenance man because of shielding placed to safeguard the plant operator. The design should not be distorted to accommodate a shield if safety may be achieved for the plant operators by distance. In many cases, the hazards from radiation decrease roughly as the square of the distance. For safety by distance to be effective with the high-radiation fields met with in the atomic energy industry the method of entry to the dangerous areas must be controlled as strictly as the entry to high-voltage areas in an electrical distribution system. Safety by shielding and safety by distance are contributions to the workers' safety from external radiation which are made by the design officers.
Plant and equipment designed for radioactive materials do not differ from other plant in that they do from time to time require either maintenance or modification and it is during such work that the factory management is faced with its greatest problems of control. The questions to be answered before beginning work in a very high radiation field of, say, 10 to 10,000 times the maximum permissible level are:
(1) Is anything to be gained by waiting ? This is always an unpopular thing to do in a factory. In certain cases where the radioactivity is due to fresh fission products a safety factor of 10 or more is gained in 24 hours by allowing the short-lived of the fission products to decay completely before beginning work.
(2) Is it possible to reduce the radiation field ? For example, if it is due to fission products inside vessels or pipework, decontamination may be both possible and worthwhile.
(3) What is the radiation dose-rate in and around the area where work is to be done ? A survey of both beta and gamma radiations is carried out to give this data.
(4) Is it possible to erect temporary radiation shields around high centres of activity or around the immediate working location ? The answer to this question is generally delicately balanced and depends upon the probable length of the work to be done, the intensity of the field, the ease with which a shield may be provided, since it must not be forgotten that men will have to erect the shield, and the influence of a shield on the work to be done. In certain locations where space is very limited a shield might so impede the maintenance man that his radiation exposure is actually increased because of the extra time needed to do the job.
(5) Are special tools necessary for remote handling of the plant or equipment ? Again the answer to this question is often delicately balanced and depends upon the beta radiation present as well as the gamma, since if the beta level is high this will constitute an additional hazard to the hands. It is often thought that thick gloves give complete beta protection, but this is not necessarily true and in any case many tasks demand manual dexterity and a good sense of feel, so that, although gloves are worn, they are often thin and well fitting-rather like surgeons' gloves.
When the method of working and permissible working time per man have been determined, then the man himself is briefed, radiation monitoring films are placed on his body, wrist, and cap, and he will carry also a pocket dosimeter, which gives a direct reading of the dose received. The man's entrance to the radiation area will be timed and he will be recalled from the job by a man specially detailed to control working times.
The men have been trained in simple procedures to reduce radiation exposure; discussion of the. next step to be taken should not take place right on the job but away from it in a low-radiation field; a mate should not stand at the craftman's shoulder unless there is a task to do.
By these commonsense methods, work in highradiation fields has been carried out successfully without over-exposing the workers.
Internal Radiation The problems associated with the protection of the workers in the atomic energy industry from the inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials have been amongst the most difficult the industry has had to tackle.
The problem itself is not new in principle; it is new only in degree. The maximum permissible concentration (m.p.c.) or maximum allowable concentration (m.a.c.), or "design concentration", to use the terminology suggested by Dr. Goldblatt at our last conference, of plutonium in air is 32 micro-micrograms per cubic metre of air, and it is this tiny quantity of the industry's product that must not be exceeded in theworking space. As well as this level for plutonium there are similar or lower levels for fission products such as strontium and iodine, which are waste-products of the industry. As The air contamination is reduced by carefully cleaning out the vessels and pipes before opening them and by arranging the work in a precise sequence so that messy or dusty actions or movements are avoided. Careful briefing of the craftsmen in procedure is necessary. Also the point where the break into the active system is made is sprayed with a solution of glycerine in water to lay any dust as soon as it becomes airborne. The glycerine is hygroscopic and prevents the water evaporating too quickly. Considerable use is made of absorbent paper shrouds placed around the necks of vessels and under pipes to facilitate the subsequent cleaning up. The volume of air which is contaminated is carefully defined by building around the work to be carried out a tent-like enclosure made of tubular steel framework and polyvinyl chloride sheet, the joins of which are sealed by a cocooning process similar to that used by the Services to encase military equipment. The contaminated air is exhausted from the tent enclosure through a highefficiency vacuum cleaner and is then fed into one of the air-trunking systems connected to the stacks. It is fortunate that as the plutonium concentration increases and the careful enclosure of active work becomes more and more necessary, so the betagamma content of the solution becomes less and less and the external radiation hazard decreases, thereby making the erection of the enclosures possible.
To provide the worker with clean air one of three methods is followed. A dust respirator fitted with a Porton dust filter type D8/42 is worn. The filter is designed to permit no more than 0-00001% penetration for i micron size particles, but the real limitation is the fit of the respirator to the man's face. When the air contamination is very high or toxic gases may be present in quantity-many of the plants have an installed carbon-dioxide fire-fighting system-then clean air must be provided for the worker rather than reliance placed upon filtered air. If the job is of short duration of up to 20 min. or great mobility is needed, then the worker carries an air bottle on his back. The fireman's " self-air " apparatus is the one in use. If the job is a larger one the worker has an airline mask fed from a filtered off-take from the factory's compressed air main or is dressed in a pressurized suit which has been developed for this type of work. The pressurized suit is made of all-welded polyvinyl chloride sheet and totally encloses its wearer. The head is in a transparent polyvinyl chloride helmet and the air supply is fed in near the neck of the helmet. The air is exhausted from the suit via a filter which both prevents back diffusion of activity into the suit and provides a pressure drop to keep the suit inflated and held just comfortably off the wearer's body.
Not only is it necessary to take these precautions during maintenance or modification work, but also it is most important to clean up completely after the operation so that any contamination left is below a level which could give rise to an ingestion or inhalation hazard. Permissible surface contamination has been set at such levels that it is believed that working for a full working lifetime with such levels on floors, benches, walls, plant, equipment, and so on, will not be injurious to the individual exposed. Detailed surface contamination surveys follow work on active plant and are part of normal routine. The worker is dressed according to the task he has to tackle. He will wear a simple coverall over his own clothes for most normal process work in the chemical plant, and will be progressively clothed as the hazard increases until he is dressed from the skin up in factory clothing and enveloped in a P.V.C. suit for the most difficult job. Undressing a man who has been in contact with active materials is a potent source of air and surface contamination, and undressers with dust respirators have been trained to do this. The wearer of a pressurized suit often has to pass through a water shower followed by a shower containing both wetting and complexing agents before removing his suit.
Just Before leaving the subject of ingestion and inhalation control, mention must be made of certain areas of the plant where small laboratory-type operations are carried out and also of the control laboratories where process-line samples are analysed and assessed. In each of these areas a new factor other than the health of the worker exerts a controlling influence: in the plant it is the purity of the product, and in the laboratory it is the necessity to maintain a low radioactivity background to enable accurate measurements on low-activity samples to be made. Operations are carried out in perspex-fronted boxes which are sealed from the working space and maintained at a negative pressure to it. Materials and samples are posted into the box through an air lock and manipulation of the equipment is carried out through long gloves which are sealed to holes cut in the perspex front.
Detection and Measurement of Hazards Before it can be hoped fully to control a hazard quantitative determination of the hazardous materials must be made. The measurement of radioactive hazards with certain exceptions are not unduly difficult.
The simplest monitor makes use of the effect by which radioactivity was discovered in 1896, namely the blackening of a photographic film. Beta-gamma radiation survey instruments and beta-gamma surface contamination instruments both use the ionization of a gas in a closed space. In the former the net electrical charge resulting from the ionization is collected by a metal electrode in the ionization chamber and the current is measured directly by a sensitive electrometer or more usually after amplification. In the latter, that is, in most contaminationmonitoring instruments, the ionization is used to trigger off bigger electrical discharges which are then counted electronically. This is the GeigerMuller effect. In the ionization chamber the ionization current will depend upon the energy of the radiation whereas in the contamination monitor, dependent upon the Geiger-Muller effect, the method is independent of the energy of the radiation provided it exceeds the minimum necessary to trigger off the discharge. Alpha surface contamination is measured by the same method, in principle, as that used originally by Rutherford and his co-workers. The scintillations caused by alpha particles falling on a zinc sulphide screen are viewed electronically, that is, with a photomultiplier tube, and the resulting electric impulses from the tube are counted by electronic counters. The zinc sulphide screen must be protected from light and is therefore enclosed in a light-tight box, one side of which is closed by an aluminized nylon foil. It is this foil which makes this instrument difficult to keep serviceable since the foil must be so thin that it will not stop an alpha particle and yet sufficiently robust to remain lighttight even when used in a factory. Air contamination is measured by taking large-volume air samples of the order of five to 25 cubic metres per hour. The air is drawn through a Whatman filter paper by a modified vacuum cleaner unit and the volume is measured by an anemometer. The filter paper, with the airborne radioactivity now deposited upon it, is presented to beta-gamma and alpha counting equipments working on the same principles as those described earlier. The activity measured is corrected for the counter efficiency, the self-absorption of the activity in the filter paper, and the filter paper efficiency, when this is necessary.
The development of laboratory tools into factory survey instruments has been the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell.
Surveys
A very large number of radiation, surface contamination, and air contamination surveys have to be made every day. It was decided to select and train a group of process workers to set up, calibrate, and operate radiation-monitoring instruments. The process workers, called health physics monitors, have carried out most successfully a very heavy programme of surveys over the last few years. They also interpret to the engineering and production sides the results of their surveys as long as " rule-ofthumb" interpretation is possible. The factory has laid down a series of contamination levels both air and surface and has specified what action is to be taken at each level. The work of the surveyors is controlled by a physicist and interpretation of a survey which is beyond the " rule-of-thumb" category is made by him.
Plutonium Air Contamination
The detection of plutonium contamination is a particularly difficult matter. The design concentration may be expressed as a quantity of plutonium which will give about 10 d.p.m./m.3 of air. Unfortunately the air contains naturally the daughter-products of both radon and thoron and amongst the isotopes in the Ra A, B, C, C', C", and D chain and the similar thorium chain are alpha emitters. The concentration of radon and thoron decay products varies widely from day to day but is in the range of 5 to 500 d.p.m./m.3 of air. Therein lies the problem; when an air sample is taken, and the alpha activity counted, the plant man requires to know at once if there is any plutonium present. The physicist is unable to do an immediate identification of the alpha activity. Two ways are open to him: first, to measure the alpha energy by an alpha energy discrimination of some sort, but this is a laboratory tool and not a factory survey instrument. In any case it is time consuming. Second, to measure the variation of activity on the filter paper with time. If it is plutonium no decay will occur since plutonium has a half-life of 25,000 years. If it is the decay products of radon and thoron then within one hour measurable decay will have occurred. But the plant man has had to wait for an hour and even then the sample tells him only of conditions an hour ago. Out of this unpromising position an operational procedure has been devised which has worked most satisfactorily.
Although the natural background varies both with time and with place, it is unusual to find it widely different at different places on the same fac- Im.3 . that is, by more than one design concentration but less than 10 design concentrations, then safety precautions are brought to readiness, all possible sources of air contamination are checked and a second determination of the activity of the sample is made 30 min. after the first determination. The extent of the decay enables a judgment to be made whether the sample does or does not contain plutonium. In any case a second sample is started immediately the first one is taken off, so during the 30 minutes' decay of the first sample the second sample is taken and assessed and that too helps in assessing the position.
At the present time the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell are working on new alphameasuring instruments which, it is hoped, will improve the position still further. One such instrument prints the alpha activity in the working space on a recorder and side by side with this prints the alpha activity in air drawn from outside the building. A direct comparison between the two is thus possible.
Safety Control in the Factories A department independent of both the production and engineering sides of the factory has been set up with its head answerable to the works general manager. This department, the Health Physics Department, is responsible for carrying out all the radiation, surface contamination, and air contamination surveys in the factory. As each survey is completed a copy is handed direct to the plant supervisor with recommendations for action where appropriate. The surveyors or health physics monitors are encouraged to work as additional members of the production and engineering team. Safety is not achieved by policemen but by the willing and full cooperation of those whom one seeks to make safe.
The head of the Health Physics Department has also been made responsible for the normal factory safety under the Factories Act and the works safety officer answers to him. This has provided an excellent and most salutary lesson to the physicists in charge of the department. They have found that accident prevention follows four well-tried paths: (1) to remove the hazard; (2) to shield the hazard; (3) to shield the worker; (4) to warn the worker. The principles necessary to achieve radiation safety are no different. It is very easy when tackling a new problem, such as radiation safety in industry, to think that it is new in principle, but responsibility for industrial safety has taught that it is not so. Safety in the atomic energy field is achieved, as safety is achieved in other industries, by a combination of "design for safety" by the design offices and "manage for safety" by the works management. Discussion Dr. A. NEMET (Philips Balham Works Ltd.) said that medical and industrial x-ray workers had learned to protect themselves from external radiation and, in industrial work at least, this could be done without any detriment to the quality of the work. The medical man, however, lived in a constant struggle between his natural wish to see more of the x-ray screen and his prudence in protecting himself with clumsy lead-rubber aprons and gloves, which hampered him. Without that protection the radiologist would suffer the maximum permissible dose, due to scatter from his own patient, in a single morning in an average hospital doing barium meals only. There seemed to be no doubt that atomic factory workers were safer from that kind of hazard than the average hospital radiologist or radiographer.
The two other hazards, airborne dust and ingestion, were of quite a different order, partly because the tolerance levels were so very low and were still getting steadily lower due to advances in biological research, but also because it appeared to be so difficult to protect the worker against carelessness.
The most serious risk was inhaled radioactive dust, because in measuring this type of contamination it was necessary to compensate for the harmless background radiation which, as Mr. Fair had said, might be one hundred times higher than the maximum permissible level of plutonium.
Something which Mr. Fair had not pointed out, but which was really the limiting factor, was the statistical fluctuation of both the background and the contamination. As, in addition, the background varied by as much as 30-1, it became clear that it was impossible to record airborne activity instantaneously; the collection of dust and the counting must take a long time in order to gather sufficient counts so that the desired accuracy of, say, 10% was obtained.
Another practical difficulty with particle-borne radiation was to make reasonably certain that the sampled air was really representative of the background and the suspect channels of the air breathed.
Mr. D. R. R. FAIR, in reply, said that the position was very different from that which existed in hospitals and laboratories, where it was necessary to depend on the individual himself; in factories there was factory discipline.
The alpha air contamination problem was the most difficult. In any one area or factory site there was a large number of air samplers operating at the same time, which made it possible to judge one particular location in the light of others. Moreover, in a process plant one hoped to be doing tomorrow the same as one was doing today. Many members of the audience were research workers, development workers, or associated with that kind of activity, and they were always hoping to be doing something new, but they should remember that the aim of the man responsible for production was to operate his plant on a steady basis. That fact helped considerably in locating trouble, because the plant was instrumented throughout and, if there was any likelihood of air contamination, it was very seldom necessary to look for it; the man in charge of the plant almost always knew of any minor change in operating conditions likely to give rise to air contamination.
In reply to other questions, Mr. FAIR said that perspex was used for equipment and appliances becauise it was unbreakable. Neither perspex nor polyvinyl chloride was damaged at the ordinary radiation levels to which man might be exposed.
As their knowledge grew, it was possible to relax safety precautions. This had been done without causing any alarm to the workers by explanation and by discussion of the Joint Factory Council.
Mr. FAIR thought Dr. EDSON'S comment was reasonable in that it was too early to say that all occupational hazards had been confronted since incubation of diseases induced by radiation ranged from three to 40 years.
